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ABSTRACT: At the outset ‘mission creep’ is a military phenomenon, denoting uncontrolled and unintended 
mission development. Even the best-laid plans may become obsolete if they run against the facts on the 
ground, and mission creep may result. Mission creep also plagues arguments, as when arguments end up in 
unrelated topics, larger targets, or clusters of topics. Our paper explores possible mutual benefits of applying 
the resources of argumentation theory and military theory to one another. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The road to hell may indeed be paved with good intentions but that hardly means we should 
give up good intentions. Rather, it means we should be prepared to look for exit ramps 
whenever we find ourselves going down that road. This sage advice is easier to give than 
follow, and perhaps nowhere is it more important but harder to heed than in military 
actions. Consider these examples: 
(1)  A NATO military column is transporting a medical officer from headquarters 
to a forward operating base some distance from the nearest village in a remote, 
desolate and war-torn countryside. The convoy slows as a burka-dressed mother 
with a young, apparently lifeless child in her arms approaches. The doctor has a 
professional obligation to help, so he signals the commander to stop, and the 
commander agrees. Soldiers are ordered out of the armoured trucks and, mindful 
of the possibilities for suicide vests and IEDs, establish a cordon at a safe distance 
around the doctor and the woman. 
The doctor renders a diagnoses of severe de-hydration and provides water. The 
woman and child are soon on their way and the military personnel return to their 
vehicles. 
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There is a sigh of relief all around because although it was not part of their mission, 
it was a good deed easily and safely achieved. It involved some risk for the soldiers 
but it was important for the desperate mother. 
Later, a local informer reports that the mother and child were killed because they 
had received medical attention from foreign infidels without the permission from 
the village elder, in contravention of local customs. 
If the villagers’ customs or their reaction had been different, this would have been a success 
story. Unfortunately, it is not. 
(2)  In response to the 9-11 terrorist attack, a US-led coalition initiated a military 
offensive against Al-Qaida strongholds in Afghanistan where the Taliban 
government had given them safe haven. The Taliban was driven from power, hard-
liners fled to Pakistan, and a more US-friendly government was installed. More 
coalition forces arrived to protect the government, coming under NATO command 
in 2003.1 
By 2008, political ambitions had broadened and the nations participating in the 
UN-sanctioned, NATO-led coalition issued a press-release identifying four goals 
(NATO, 2008): 
(i) Building an enduring, stable, secure, and prosperous democratic state; 
(ii) Defending such basic values as freedom, democracy, and human rights; 
(iii)  Eliminating terrorism and extremism as threats to stability; 
(iv)  Establishing and maintaining a secure environment and good governance. 
That vision was presented 6 years after the campaign started – and 12 years ago. 
 
The first example is a specific and localized incident: the actions of the soldiers were not 
part of their assigned mission. They were in response to the specific circumstances and 
conditions in which the soldiers found themselves. The second is more global: the actions 
of the military forces shifted into a more defensive posture from its initial offense-minded 
orientation, but that change was not in response to any specific incidents or military 
strategy. Rather, it was part of a larger transformation of their mission that was mainly 
dictated by governmental policy. 
These two examples sit at opposite ends of a spectrum of phenomena that fall under 
the rubric “Mission Creep” – the unintended but almost inexorable tendency of military 
actions to broaden beyond their original scope. A military force that sets out on a 
humanitarian intervention to build schools may become embroiled in a civil war when it 
defends those schools from attack; carefully delineated attempts at temporarily stabilizing 
a weak government slowly evolve into wholesale nation building if the institutional 
supports fail to take root; when the conditions allow it, there is little to stop a military action 
that begins as part of a retaliation from turning into an opportunistic war of conquest (see 
Tierney, 2017). 
 
1 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established on Dec. 20, 2001 with UN SC 
mandate 1386;  
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Although the specific term mission creep is relatively new,2 the phenomenon itself 
is not. Nor is its usage confined to military operations, finding footholds in the languages 
of non-profit organizations, politics, education, and law enforcement. Surprisingly, it has 
not entered into the discourse of argumentation theory. We say “surprisingly” for two 
reasons: first, there are quite obvious counterparts to the phenomenon in argumentation; 
and second, the constellation of concepts associated with the military is routinely paired 
with the constellation of concepts associated with argumentation because of the ubiquity 
of the argument-is-war metaphor and the Dominant Adversarial Models (“DAM 
accounts”) for argumentation (see Cohen 1995 and Rooney 2010 for the former; Bailin & 
Battersby 2017 and Stevens and Cohen 2018 for the latter). While it would certainly be 
feasible and very likely be fruitful to deploy the resources of argumentation theory to 
explore and explain the phenomenon – perhaps as the dangerous result of chasing a Red 
Herring down a Slippery Slope – in this paper, we will reverse directions and exploit the 
resources of military theory to identify the sources of mission creep in argumentation and, 
ultimately, strategies for controlling it. 
 
 
2. MISSION CREEP 
 
The two examples above offer a full range of comparisons and contrasts. The common 
points are manifest: both examples include actions that are re-actions rather than deliberate, 
pro-active decisions; both are motivated by good intentions; and both examples end with 
unintended and unwanted results. It is their contrasts, however that are most instructive. 
The example of the doctor and the convoy is so localized that it hardly affects the overall 
mission; it only barely qualifies as mission creep but it could be a first step in that direction. 
In contrast, the change from retaliation to nation-building is much more global in scope 
and amounts to a wholesale make-over of the mission. The first incident involves what was 
potentially a once-off, isolated incident while the second case entails a permanent change 
with long-term consequences. The first involves a minor change in tactics; the second 
operates at the level of strategy.  
For our purposes, however, the most important contrast is between the causes of 
those changes because that is where lessons for argumentation can be gleaned. The strategic 
change was largely dictated from above by policy changes while it was unexpected facts 
on the ground that were the occasion for the tactical improvisation. As a first 
approximation, we will characterize the contrast as the difference between “top-down” and 
“bottom-up” causation. That is, however, only a first approximation because the lines of 
influence go both ways. It is, of course, entirely possible for there to be some tension 
between the dictates arising from the specific situation in the field and the strategic 
mandates emanating from policy considerations. However, it is also possible that the 
tactical dictates from below and the strategic mandates from above complement and 
reinforce one another. When that sort of harmonic resonance occurs, incremental mission 
creep risks accelerating into an all-out mission stampede. This description conforms 
reasonably well to the series of historical events that began with the assassination of an 
 
2 Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission_creep) dates the term to 1993 and the UN military 
operations in Somalia; Merriam-Webster (https://www.merriam-webster.com/time-traveler) puts the first 
occurrence in 1991.  
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archduke in June of 1914 and within a month became the Great War to End All Wars. 
Sadly, we also think this description comfortably fits the all-too-common pattern of small 
differences in standpoint leading to disagreements that grow into disputes before spiraling 
out of control into full-blown and very uncomfortable arguments in the most pejorative 
sense of the term. 
 
 
3. MISSION CREEP FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
 
The first incident illustrates one of the major sources of mission change. The decision to 
stop was triggered by the specific situation. What initially looked like a good thing to do, 
resulted in a terrible outcome. The column commander should not have stopped, even 
though the doctor, who also out-ranked him, insisted. The column leader’s orders were 
simple enough. So was the good doctor’s obligation to help. Analysing the story gives us 
some important aspects; the order was formulated based on cultural, demographically and 
situational awareness, and signed by an officer in charge. The road ahead included multiple 
threats, and even though the mother looked innocent enough, a remote-controlled explosive 
device could have been used, with an equally devastating outcome.  
The facts on the ground matter, and unexpected facts matter in unexpected ways. 
When we refer to facts on the ground, that can be taken so literally as to mean the local 
topography – hills, ravines, marshes, etc. – but can also take the form of a woman with a 
sick child, bad weather, logistical snafus, an outbreak of the flu, or shifts in alliances.  
The facts matter in both argumentation and military actions, and so do changes in 
the facts. In military operations, changes in the facts on the ground dictate changes in tactics 
– as well they should – but the more that the facts on the ground dictate tactical responses 
the more they can become detached from strategic considerations of long-term 
consequences and how specific actions will contribute to or detract from the mission’s 
overall goals. Here is an illustration showing ideal cases and cases of mission creep. 
 
 
 
Figure. 1. Mission creep 
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Missions are closely related to war narratives (see Kvernbekk & Bøe-Hansen 2017).  
A war narrative represents an existential, vitally important vision of what is to be achieved. 
It provides the framework for policy, the foundation of “truths” that the populace can 
accept. Furthermore, it presents a war logic thought to be beyond dispute; a “handbook” 
for why the mission is to be undertaken and how to be argued for. The term Area of 
Operations (AO) is a generic term in military operations for the conduct of combat and 
non-combat activities. The AO is an area within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) defined 
by the joint force commander for conducting operations (NATO, 2019). It describes most 
often the specific area assigned to a subordinate commander for a specific mission. The 
AO is where the facts on the ground are to be found, at least a certain set of them. They 
may prove to be amenable to the mission, or they may function as obstacles or hindrances 
that thwart or prevent the course of the original mission, or make the target of original 
mission unattainable altogether. 
 The most egregious case would be forces operating in the total absence of any 
orders founded on a clear and consistent mission statement or, what amounts to about the 
same thing, in the absence of any discipline. They would in effect be rogue forces. 
Something similar will result if there is no single, coherent voice at the top of the chain of 
command, which is often the case since so many modern military operations are carried 
out by coalitions whose constituent countries have their own political agendas. A vacuum 
at the top opens the door for mission creep from the bottom. Of course, the mere existence 
of an articulated, univocal statement offers no guarantees of success: it also has to be 
effectively communicated throughout the chain of command and its implementation among 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels needs to be well-integrated (see Taw and 
Peters, 1995). Otherwise, the results are again likely to be the same. 
Things might have worked out differently in our example of the convoy, the doctor, 
and the woman with her child, but we cannot know how the story would have played out 
in the event that, say, the village elder had decided that forgiveness or perhaps even 
gratitude was an appropriate and acceptable response. We can imagine that the mission 
accomplishing its task and reaching closure, but we can just as easily imagine the local 
success story leading to greater commitment with disastrous results. It’s precisely that 
uncertainty that is salient and so dangerous. It is why all NATO operational orders 
explicitly state: “Avoid Mission Creep”. But equally salient is that mission creep is only 
something to “avoid” rather than something that is “strictly forbidden” (see Siegel, 2000). 
The phenomenon is too complex for a simple prohibition, too inevitable to be completely 
eradicated, and too unpredictable to be effectively controlled; sometimes it even surprises 
us and works out for the best. It is, in a word, too human.  
So, too, is argumentation. Arguments often take us in unintended directions. 
 
 
4. MISSION CREEP FROM THE TOP DOWN  
 
The second case is more in line with the common conception of mission creep due to 
military or political overreach, and for which some measure of culpability needs to be 
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assigned. Nobody signed on to 18 years in Afghanistan, so should not someone be held 
accountable for creating this Frankenstein’s monster?3  
 Part of the felt need to assign blame is because we (speaking now as Westerners 
from NATO countries) have to share in the responsibility for the current political, military, 
and humanitarian quagmire but we were supposed to be “the good guys” there. The 
coalition forces in Afghanistan are under UN and NATO auspices for humanitarian 
purposes, so it was easy for the soldiers to be thought of, and not just by themselves, as a 
“force for good”. The finger of blame has to point somewhere else, and there are not many 
options besides higher up the command chain. A case in point is the Norwegian military 
presence in Afghanistan, 2001-2014. In 2016 an evaluation was published; the gist of 
which is as follows: In the big picture Norway did little of significance. At the outset the 
Norwegian government had three main objectives for the Afghanistan engagement; an 
effort with the US and NATO, against international terror and for a better Afghanistan – a 
stable and democratic Afghan state through long-term development aid and peace 
diplomacy. In the end the most important objective was the alliance dimension; supporting 
the US and secure NATO’s relevance – which is considered achieved. The second objective 
was partly achieved while the third is still not achieved (NOU 2016). 
 In general outline, the good-guy characterization applies to most international 
operations since the end of the Cold War. They have been charged with promoting peace, 
peace-keeping, or security assistance, often in conjunction with a variety of broadly 
humanitarian goals from building schools and hospitals to vaccinating children and drilling 
water wells. They are indeed “forces for good”, at least according to the contributing 
nations as a designation for internal political consumption. Where, then, is the culpability? 
Only in rare cases will culpability for mission creep gone awry lie with a specific 
individual. The fault is often embedded in the entire chain of command because the 
problem of mission creep often arises from interactions between different levels of 
command when planning and executing a military campaign rather than from a single level. 
On the other hand, it might not be the plan or the orders that leads to mission creep, but the 
people and their interpretation of the order. Or it could be neither of the above: It could be 
due to cultural problems spiced with religious divisions and different languages, history 
and traditions.  
The realization of political ambitions into military operations takes place through a 
chain of command where each level has its own roles and functions – and its own 
responsibilities (NATO, 2019). A brief, schematic account of the levels of command will 
identify four components: (1) the political and governmental institutions, (2) the high-level 
military-strategic command, (3) the mid-level operational command, and (4) the tactical 
level making decisions for the soldiers on the ground. 
 
3 Or as Clausewitz formulated it: “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – 
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct 
it.” 
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Figure 2: Levels of Command 
 
While some parts are unique to each command level, there needs to be some overlap with 
the next level to ensure the effective transfer of tasks between the levels. There is also some 
shared responsibility for those tasks, in the sense of shared duties to see they are 
accomplished, which, if things go awry in the end, become a shared responsibility, in the 
sense of culpability. 
Through the political-strategic dialogue, the military-strategic command level 
conveys the strategic goals and ambitions as a campaign plan or a strategic directive. The 
operational command level translates the strategic goals into an operational plan with 
concrete tasks for subordinate tactical units. To a far greater extent that with the political 
level, the interactions between the strategic, operational and tactical levels is dynamic and 
go both ways. Any level can, and should, open lines of communication between 
representatives from subordinate and higher levels, to coordinate planning and ensure that 
implementation is in accordance with higher level intentions. Because each and every link 
in the chain of command can be an occasion for poor communication or 
miscommunication, mis-relayed or modified orders, or failures of execution of various 
sorts, each interface represents an opening for a shift in the mission.  
Even the best command cannot eliminate all possibilities for mission creep from 
below. There are too many factors to take into account, especially when the campaign is 
waged on foreign soil: climate, meteorology, geography, topography and demography may 
be relatively easy to prepare for because the range of possibilities is limited and it identifies 
what can be expected. The same cannot always be said for complications arising from 
cultural dynamics, political reactions, religious influences, and social structures.  
What the best command can control, however, is the internal dynamics which allow 
for mission creep from above. This applies to both the planning and execution stages of the 
operation. The problems in execution fall into three categories: failures of communication, 
inadequately drawn lines of responsibility, and operational inefficiencies. While these may 
be exceedingly difficult to eradicate or control, or even just identify, in practice, they do 
not pose any insuperable obstacles for theory.  
We are tempted to say that the situation is reversed with respect to planning – that 
the theoretical obstacles are insuperable while the practical problems are more or less 
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routine – except for the fact that when it comes to military operations, nothing is ever 
routine. Still, the temptation is there because there is a grain of truth in it: since execution 
is never routine, the very idea of perfect planning is either an aspirational ideal or a delusion 
for political propaganda. No amount of planning can prepare for all the possible 
contingencies. If the planning stages were able to issue a complete flow-chart or algorithm 
with instructions for every situation that could arise, life would easy for those at the 
operational level. It is not. Planning is an open-ended process. The more contingencies 
accommodated, the better the plans are and the better-off the operation will be. To that end, 
wise planners will facilitate the inclusion of all relevant perspectives, from the grandest, 
most global political goals to that of the individual soldier on the ground. They will assess 
as many relevant factors as intelligence, time, and resources permit in order to optimize the 
balance between political goals and military capabilities. This is where the construction of 
possible scenarios and hypothetical reasoning is useful: it yields guidelines of the forms “If 
x happens, use plan B, but if y happens, use plan C, etc.” There is of course a limit to how 
many alternative plans of action are possible and feasible to make. Moreover, plans B and 
C could contain ideas that in the case of x or y would make it advisable for us to alleviate, 
forestall, reinforce, repair, or otherwise alter the overall goals, albeit leaving as much of 
the original target intact and attainable. That is, the best planning will take as input all the 
foreseeable contingencies and yield as output a clear mission statement with realistic, 
achievable, and well-defined goals.   
And one more thing: because the range of possible contingencies inevitably 
outstrips even the best laid plans of politicians and soldiers, no mission statement should 
be regarded as complete, or, for that matter, even minimally acceptable, if it does not 
explicitly include attention to an end state and exit strategies. Otherwise, we will be at the 
mercy of whatever mission creep comes our way. The example of Afghanistan is Exhibit 
A and a prime cautionary tale: Even though it has reduced its footprint and focused its 
resources just on Kabul, the capital, NATO still operates in Afghanistan. Does NATO even 
have an exit strategy? Did it ever? An endemic problem for war narratives is that their 
rhetorical function in justifying action often precludes any space for articulating any exit 
strategies. 
We will leave it to historians and military theorists to argue about how many well-
intentioned campaigns have come a-cropper for want of an exit strategy and ended up as 
unmitigated disasters. We want to raise the same question about arguments:  
 
How many arguments have gone off the rails as the arguers have dug in 
their heels, changed the “mission”, and lost control of the narrative to 
disastrous ends, all because surrender was unacceptable and no other exit 
strategy was envisioned? 
 
Planning has to include taking contingencies into account; contingencies can change the 
mission; operations can go bad; so high among the contingencies that need to be considered 
are those that concern first, a mission’s ends – its goals – and second, the end of the 
mission, including both situations in which the goals have been met and outcomes in which 
they have not. It is, perhaps, understandable why arguers pay little attention to this; it is 
less understandable why argumentation theorists pay so little attention to it. 
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4. MISSION CREEP IN ARGUMENTS 
 
Arguments, in the relevant sense, are complex and dynamic series of events that unfold 
over time. They can seem to have lives of their own that include growth and change. If they 
were just static sequences of timeless propositions to be assessed wholly on the basis of 
their inferential relations, we would not have to worry about mission creep. Instead, we 
need to consider the variety of changes that can occur in the course of an argument, like 
the following:  
(1) We start arguing for one thesis but end up arguing for another. Again, this could 
be either positive or negative: negative, if the new thesis is “a bridge too far“, an 
unjustifiable or unsuccessful over-reach; a positive if the new thesis is an 
improvement over the original one in response to the push-back – i.e., the feedback 
in the form of objections and questions – from the opposition, arguing in order to 
establish T, but continue arguing in order to further explore and understand the 
thesis and all its ramifications (benign enthusiasm?). 
(2) We begin by arguing against an opponent’s thesis, but find ourselves arguing 
for a thesis of our own, or, conversely, we start out arguing for something but soon 
find ourselves on the defensive, perhaps regarding the thesis in question but perhaps 
in defense of what was thought to be a safe or even unacknowledged prior 
assumption. 
Both examples involve the targeted conclusion or standpoint in the argument and both are 
in response to the dialectical engagement, the counterpart to tactical changes dictated from 
below.  Arguments also change in ways that are more policy-driven, like the top-down 
cases: 
(3) We start arguing about one topic but end up arguing about something else. As 
in military mission creep, this could be either a negative development, if we end 
following a Red Herring, or a positive one, if the earlier engagement reveals what 
we really should have been pursuing all along. 
(4) We start arguing about topic A, but because of “clustering” (see Dascal & Knoll 
2011), we end up arguing about topics B, C, and D – opening new “fronts” but 
making progress on none of them.  Even if the direct conceptual connections 
between, say, gay rights and abortion or between climate change and national 
security are weak and indirect, the contingent political, psychological, and social 
connections are more than enough to entangle us. 
 
In these examples, the entire argument has veered off-course as the subject matter of the 
argument, and not just the concluding thesis, has changed. The next two examples might 
concern the arguers more than the subject matter: 
 (5) After getting the opponents to accede to our initial thesis or proposal, we 
continue arguing in an attempt to persuade and then to convince them. The kind of 
victory has come to matter, and that means somehow changing or transforming our 
opponents.  
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Victory in an argument that does not entail any cognitive change in the arguers, like military 
victories without any political change, will never last for very long (even if you’ve “got 
them by the balls”4). 
(6) Similarly, but less benignly, we may start arguing in order to win an argument 
by defeating the opponents but end up trying to trounce, convert, or even humiliate 
them. Competitive excess makes it personal. 
From one perspective, these do fit the pattern of mission creep: incremental changes in the 
goals in response to the opportunities that present themselves. However, the difference 
between targeting an argument and targeting an arguer has far too much significance for 
argumentation theory to conflate the cases.  
Finally, let us offer one more example to illustrate another important phenomenon 
in argumentation: a change in the dialog type, i.e., a change in kind of argument itself. 
(7) We may enter an adversarial argument in order to establish a thesis, say, or get 
a proposed course of action accepted, but in the course of arguing we turn to less 
confrontational negotiating or something even more cooperative like joint 
deliberating in order to make some progress towards a resolution.  
Unfortunately, belligerence tends to ratchet up, so that things more often move in the 
opposite direction, but we find some comfort in the idea that ratcheting down the 
adversariality is at least a possibility (For recent discussions, see: Rooney 2010, Stevens 
and Cohen 2018, and Casey 2020). 
Ubiquitous as it may be, mission creep in argumentation is not inevitable, and this 
is where we can take our cue from military theory. The military analogies provide some 
guidance. The distinction between mission creep arising from tactical maneuvering and 
top-down changes due to policy and strategy evolution has counterparts in argumentation, 
so it provides an especially helpful lens for viewing the phenomena.  
Most obviously, multi-party argumentation in practice is almost entirely a matter 
of tactical responses in response to reasons, objections, questions, and replies. If we have 
a clear and articulate standpoint, we can prepare lines of reasoning in advance, anticipate 
some objections, and have a stock of answers ready (like plan B and plan C). Thus, the first 
thing needed is the same kind of advance planning that results in a clear and articulate 
mission statement for military actions and a defined exit strategy. And the second thing 
needed is, just as before, the right kind of discipline to stay on message. We might not think 
of discipline as a particularly argumentative virtue, but there is an art to finding and staying 
focused on the mean between completely rigid tunnel vision and overreacting to every goad 
and provocation in an argument. 
The pattern of top-down mission creep is less immediately applicable because there 
are no exact counterparts to the four-part chain of command  but the general lessons still 
hold: even if it is not a matter of communication between distinct, independent entities, it 
is important to have a coherent and integrated game plan for staying on track; there may be 
no need to draw lines demarcating different areas of responsibility, but arguers do need to 
take responsibility for their argumentation, and “operational inefficiencies” in execution  
can still gum the works. In a word, that the upper echelons of the argumentative chain of 
 
4 This runs counter to the wisdom embodied in the quotation, “If you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts 
and minds will follow,” popularized during the Vietnam War, and variously attributed to President Lyndon 
Johnson and General William Westmoreland, as well as, probably apocryphally, President Theodore 
Roosevelt. 
11 
command need to control mission creep is a kind of wisdom: the wisdom to know when 
and how to argue, but for the specific problem of mission creep it is the wisdom not to enter 
arguments without exit strategies for all the foreseeable contingencies. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
  
We hope that this exercise in comparing military actions and argumentation has succeeded 
in three things: first, simply identifying the phenomenon of mission creep in argumentation, 
recognizing its significance, and bringing it to the attention of argumentation theorists for 
further theorizing; second, using the military model as a diagnostic tool both for 
understanding the causes for different kinds of mission creep and for bringing such 
ameliorative virtues as preparedness and the discipline to stay on topic into focus; and third, 
revealing just how important, and how difficult, it is to consider exit strategies in 
argumentation.  
Where this exercise admittedly falls short is that having come to the recognition of 
how important exit strategies are for argumentation – and an appreciation for why it is most  
important precisely when the appropriateness of a covering “war narrative for arguing” 
makes formulating exit strategies most difficult – we have not made any headway at all on 
that problem. In part, it is a failure due to the absence of a well-developed body of military 
theorizing on the subject to serve as a template. But we like to think that it is also at least 
in part because we are trying to model the focus and discipline needed to resist what would 
be a rather appalling example of mission creep. 
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